

# A Brief Introduction to the Zero Knowledge Proof

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## Breakthrough Result of GMR: Zero Knowledge Proof

- Conceived in 1985 by Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Micali, and Charles Rackoff.
- Their paper "*The Knowledge Complexity of Interactive Proof-Systems*" got accepted in **SIAM'85**.
- Received **Godel Prize** in 1993 for advances in Theoretical Computer Science.



# I. Proofs and Proof System

# Notion of Proof

**What is Proof ?**









# Notion of Proof

## What is Proof ?

“A proof is whatever **convinces** me” – Shimon Even (1978)

A proof involves two parties:

- Prover – One who supplies the proof in favor of the statement
- Verifies – One who verifies the proof

However, a proof makes no sense unless it can be **efficiently** verified / the verification process is simple.







# A Formal Notion of Proof System

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
Given  $\mathcal{L}$  and  $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ , goal is to prove  $x \in \mathcal{L}$ .

## Valid Proof System


- **Efficient**- Verification of the proof should be **simple** (run time should be polynomial of the size of the proof)
- **Completeness** - True statement must have a proof ( $\forall x \in \mathcal{L}, \exists \pi$  s.t.  $V(x, \pi) = \top$ )
- **Soundness** - False statement does not have any proof ( $\forall x \notin \mathcal{L}, \forall \pi$  s.t.  $V(x, \pi) = \perp$ )

# NP- An Example of a Classical Valid Proof System

## Graph Isomorphism




$\cong_{\phi}$



# NP- An Example of a Classical Valid Proof System


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


## Isomorphism

$$\{\phi(1) = a, \phi(2) = h, \phi(3) = d, \phi(4) = i, \phi(5) = g, \phi(6) = b, \phi(7) = j, \phi(8) = c\}$$


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
$$\phi$$


- Prover (P) sends  $\phi$  as the proof  $\pi$  to the verifier (V)
- V verifies  $\pi$  is a valid permutation. Run time is poly.
- Proof is complete and sound.

# NP- An Example of a Classical Valid Proof System



$$\phi$$

$$\cong$$




- Prover (P) sends  $\phi$  as the proof  $\pi$  to the verifier (V)
- V verifies  $\pi$  is a valid permutation. Run time is poly.
- Proof is complete and sound.
- NP is the set of languages with classical valid proof system
- No interaction between P and V



# Example of a language not in NP

Can we have a language which cannot be proved in classical proof system ?


## Graph Non-Isomorphism (GNI)



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


Send all possible permutations  $\phi$  on  $G_1$  to  $V$

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


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In fact, we do not know  $GNI \in NP$



# Interactive Proof System (IP)

## Interactive Protocol

- P wants to prove  $x \in \mathcal{L}$
- V is probabilistic in nature – it tosses coins and hence errs with some probability – (Randomness)
- Instead of reading the proof,  $V \leftrightarrow P$  to establish the validity of the assertion – (Interactive)
- V finally accepts the proof with some probability.

## Valid Interactive Proof System

- **Efficient**- Verification of the proof should be **simple** – (V is a ppt algorithm)
- **Completeness** -  $\forall x \in \mathcal{L}, \Pr[V \text{ accepts in } (P, V)(x)] = 1$
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# Distinguishing Problem – An Example of IP


P




V



I can distinguish the taste of Pepsi from Coke




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# Distinguishing Problem – An Example of IP

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V



How does P prove her claim to V ?

# Distinguishing Problem – An Example of IP


P



V



Tell me is it Coke / Pepsi?



$b = 0$ , pour pepsi  
 $b = 1$ , pour coke



# Distinguishing Problem – An Example of IP

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V




Tell me is it Coke / Pepsi?

$b' \in \{0, 1\}$


Success :  $b = b'$   
Fail :  $b \neq b'$

# Distinguishing Problem – An Example of IP




- If P really knows the difference then it always succeeds – **(Complete)**

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
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

# Distinguishing Problem – An Example of IP




- If P really knows the difference then it always succeeds – **(Complete)**
- If P does not know, then it fails with probability ( ? )  $1/2$
- Repeat the experment afresh and continues for  $t$  times – **Soundness error  $2^{-t}$**

# GNI has an Interactive Proof

P



I can prove these two graphs are non-isomorphic





V



# GNI has an Interactive Proof

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V



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
I don't believe you







# GNI has an Interactive Proof



- Complete and Soundness error  $2^{-t}$
- Trivial to see that  $\text{NP} \subseteq \text{IP}$
- $\text{IP} = \text{PSPACE}$



# The Notion of Knowledge

**What is Knowledge ?**



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*Knowledge is the ability to complete a new task* – Rafael Pass and Abhi Shelat

A conversation between two parties conveys knowledge when it allows the recipient to complete a “new” task that she could not complete before



# The Notion of Knowledge

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### Can we quantify knowledge ?

- **Hard** to quantify knowledge.



# The Notion of Knowledge– An Example

## RSA Cryptosystem

- $N = pq, \phi(N) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$
- choose  $e \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ ,  $d = e^{-1} \bmod \phi(N)$
- $pk_A = (N, e), sk_A = (N, d)$

A



B



$(m = \text{"Meeting @ 10:30 p.m."}, \text{Sign}_{sk_A}(m))$



# The Notion of Knowledge– An Example



I know the factorization of  $N$

I don't believe you

A

B



$(m = \text{"Meeting @ 10:30 p.m"} , \text{Sign}_{sk_A}(m))$





# The Notion of Knowledge– An Example



A



$(m = \text{"You are fired"} , \text{Sign}_{sk_B}(m))$




$(m = \text{"You Bastard! Get out of this office"} , \text{Sign}_{sk_A}(m))$

B





# The Notion of Knowledge– An Example




“I know the graph is eulerian”



**Does the message convey any knowledge ?**


# The Notion of Knowledge– An Example



**Does the message convey any knowledge ?**

No! I can very well compute whether the graph is “eulerian” or not.

# The Notion of Knowledge– An Example



**Does the message convey any knowledge ?**

No! I can very well compute whether the graph is “eulerian” or not. –  
 (**Zero-Knowledge**)





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**How do we model the proof system does not convey any knowledge ?**











# Notion of Simulator

## Rationale of Simulator

- It postulates that whatever a party can do “efficiently” by itself cannot be considered a gain from interaction with the outside.
- However, failure to provide a simulation of an interaction does NOT necessarily mean that this interaction results in some “real gain” (in some intuitive sense).
- What matters is that any “real gain” can NOT occur whenever we are able to present a simulation.



# Variants of Zero Knowledge Proofs

## Perfect Zero Knowledge Proof

$(P, V)$  is PZK for  $\mathcal{L}$  if  $\forall V^*, \exists M^*$  s.t.  $\forall x \in \mathcal{L}$  the following two conditions hold:

- $\Pr[M^*(x) = \perp] \leq 1/2,$
- $\forall \alpha, \Pr[M^*(x) = \alpha \mid M^*(x) \neq \perp] = \Pr[(P, V^*)(x) = \alpha].$

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## Statistical Zero Knowledge

$(P, V)$  is SZK for  $\mathcal{L}$  if  $\forall V^*, \exists M^*$  s.t.  $\forall x \in \mathcal{L}$  the following two conditions hold:  
ensembles are statistically close as functions of  $|x|$ :

- $Pr[M^*(x) = \perp] \leq 1/2,$
- $\{(P, V^*)(x)\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}} \approx_{sd} \{M^*(x)\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}.$

# Variants of Zero Knowledge Proof

## Computational Zero Knowledge

$(P, V)$  is CZK for  $\mathcal{L}$  if  $\forall V^*, \exists M^*$  s.t.  $\forall x \in \mathcal{L}$  the following two conditions hold: are computationally indistinguishable:

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
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## Relation among the notions

$$\text{BPP} \subset \text{PZK} \subseteq \text{SZK} \subseteq \text{CZK} \subseteq \text{IP}$$



# Examples of ZKP : Two Balls and the Color-Blind Friend





# Examples of ZKP : Two Balls and the Color-Blind Friend



“(i) Take the two balls”



# Examples of ZKP : Two Balls and the Color-Blind Friend



“(i) Take the two balls. (ii) Take your hands back”



# Examples of ZKP : Two Balls and the Color-Blind Friend



“(i) Take the two balls. (ii) Take your hands back”

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swap if  $b = 0$   
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“See my hands and tell whether I swapped or not”



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


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
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
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(**Complete**)

# Examples of ZKP : Two Balls and the Color-Blind Friend



- If Alice really knows the balls are distinguishable, then she always wins – **(Complete)**
- If Alice does not know then she fails with probability  $2^{-t}$  after ‘ $t$ ’ many repetitions – **(Soundness error)**

# Examples of ZKP : Two Balls and the Color-Blind Friend



After the experiment, Bob does not know which ball is of which color – (**Zero Knowledge**)

# Example of ZKP : Discrete Log Problem

## Recap of Discrete Log Problem

- $G$  be a multiplicative cyclic group, generated by  $\langle g \rangle \in G$ .
- Each element  $y \in G$  can be uniquely written as  $y = g^x$  for some  $x$
- (DL Problem) – Given  $g$  and  $y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} G$  find  $x$

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
### Result

- Different sub-exponential algorithms are available, e.g., Pohlig-Hellman, index calculus etc.
- Nevertheless, the problem is hard to solve and the basis for Diffie-Hellman Key exchange algorithm

# Example of ZKP : Discrete Log Problem

$$\langle g \rangle = \mathbb{Z}_p^*$$

$$x \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*, y \leftarrow g^x \bmod p$$


 $(g, p, y)$ 


# Example of ZKP : Discrete Log Problem




“ I want to access my locker”




Alice,  $(g, p, y)$




# Example of ZKP : Discrete Log Problem



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
“ Verified! You can access the locker”

Alice,  $(g, p, y)$



# Example of ZKP : Discrete Log Problem

## Vulnerability




"Here is the key of Alice,  $x$ "

Alice,  $(g, p, y)$




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
## Vulnerability



Can Alice prove to the guard her secret  $x$  in zero knowledge way ?

# Example of ZKP : Discrete Log Problem

$$r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*, h \leftarrow g^r \pmod{p}$$



Alice,  $(g, p, y)$




# Example of ZKP : Discrete Log Problem

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


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
# Example of ZKP : Discrete Log Problem

$$r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*, h \leftarrow g^r \bmod p$$




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$$r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*, h \leftarrow g^r \text{ mod } p$$



# Example of ZKP : Discrete Log Problem

$$r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*, h \leftarrow g^r \pmod p$$



Repeat the game for ' $t$ ' times



## Example of ZKP : Discrete Log Problem

### Completeness and Soundness

- **Complete** If Alice really knows the secret  $x$ , then she will always win the game
- **Soundness** If Alice cheats, then the probability of winning the game in a trial is  $1/2$  (how ?).

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view of the interaction  $\text{view}_{\text{guard}}^{\text{Alice}}(g, p, y) = (h, b, s)$

- Pick  $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$

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## Completeness and Soundness


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- Transcript of the simulator:  $M^*(g, p, y) = (h, b, s)$
- Observe that  $\text{view}_{\text{guard}}^{\text{Alice}}(g, p, y) \cong M^*(g, p, y)$  (**Try at home!**).

# Example of ZKP : Graph Isomorphism (GI)



Graph Isomorphism has a zero knowledge proof. In fact  $GI \in CZK$ .





# Applications of ZKP

- Identity Verification: Efficient Replacement of PIN number.













**Thank you for your kind attention !**