

CPA - Secure Encryption


Recap

- Indistinguishability (S_1) under Eavesdropping
- $G \rightarrow PRG$, then Π that achieves S_1 .
- $S_1 \rightarrow$ defined for single c/Ts
- $S_1' \rightarrow$ Ind under eavesdropping (multiple encryption)
- Π doesn't achieve S_1' (In fact no deterministic Π can achieve S_1')
- $S_2 \rightarrow S_1 + CPA$
- $S_2' \rightarrow S_2 + \text{Mult encryption (LOR)}$
- $S_2 \equiv S_2'$

Content


- PRF ($PRP, SPRP$)
- $\Pi \rightarrow$ Assuming PRF exists, achieves S_2
- Modes of operation using PRF/PRP

Indistinguishability under CPA




Ind under CPA (Multiple Enc)

(LOR)



Ind under CPA (ROR)

↳ (Real or Random)



$$\Pr[\text{PrivK}_{\Pi, A}^{\text{ROR}} = 1]$$

$$= \Pr[b = \hat{b}]$$

$$\leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(n)$$

Result

LOR $\equiv$ ROR (Home Work)

Secure ^{Π}

PRF (Pseudo Random Function)

$F: \overset{(key)}{\{0,1\}^*} \times \overset{(i/p)}{\{0,1\}^*} \rightarrow \overset{(o/p)}{\{0,1\}^*}$ is called a PRF

if $\forall$ PPTadv D , $\exists \text{negl}$, (Security parameter $\rightarrow n$)

$$\forall K \in \mathcal{K}, \left| \Pr_{K \leftarrow \mathcal{K}} [D^{F_K(\cdot)} = 1] - \Pr_{f \leftarrow \mathcal{F}_{\text{func}}} [D^f(\cdot) = 1] \right| \leq \text{negl}(n)$$

(Indistinguish F_K from a random function.)

Permutation
 $\hookrightarrow$ PRP

$\boxed{\text{PRF}_{A,F}}$

Ch

A

$b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$

if $b = 1$

$k \leftarrow K$

$O := F_k$

else

$f \leftarrow \text{Func}(D, R)$

$O := f$

m_i

$c_i = O(m_i)$

$\boxed{\text{ROR} \stackrel{?}{=} \text{PRF}}$

b

$\left\{ \text{PRF}_{A,F} = 1 \text{ if } b = \hat{b} \right.$

$$\Pr[\text{PRF}_{A,F} = 1] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}$$

$$\Pr[\hat{b} = b]$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} [\hat{b} = 1 | b = 1] + \frac{1}{2} [\hat{b} = 0 | b = 0]$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} \Pr[A^{F_k} = 1] + \frac{1}{2} \Pr[A^f = 0]$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} (\Pr[A^{F_k} = 1] - \Pr[A^f = 1]) (1 - \Pr[A^f = 1])$$

Examples

$$F: \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$$

$$F_k(x) = k \oplus x$$

Is F a PRF?

$F_k / \mathcal{F}$

$\mathcal{A}$

$\xleftarrow{x_1}$

$\xrightarrow{y_1}$

$\xleftarrow{x_2}$

$\xrightarrow{y_2}$

$\xleftarrow{\hat{b}}$

if $(x_1 \oplus x_2 = y_1 \oplus y_2)$
else $\hat{b} \leftarrow 1$
 $\hat{b} \leftarrow 0$

if $b=1$ i.e. F_k

$$- y_1 = k \oplus x_1$$

$$- y_2 = k \oplus x_2$$

$$- y_1 \oplus y_2 = x_1 \oplus x_2$$

$$\begin{array}{l} y_1 = f(x_1) \\ y_2 = f(x_2) \\ \hline f(x_1) \oplus f(x_2) \\ \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \\ \hline = 0 \end{array}$$

$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \pi}^{\text{PRF}} =$

$$\left| 1 - \frac{1}{2^n} \right|$$

$$F: \{0,1\}^k \times \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$$

Π

Enc_k(M)

- $r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$
- return $(r, F_k(r) \oplus m)$

Dec_k(c)

- $(c_1, c_2) \leftarrow c$
- $m \leftarrow F_k(c_1) \oplus c_2$

If F is PRF secure
then Π is IND-CPA.

$F_K / \mathbb{F}$

$\mathcal{D}$
 $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$

$r_i \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$

$\leftarrow r_i$

$\xrightarrow{y_i = \mathcal{U}(r_i)}$

$C_i = (r_i, y_i \oplus m_i)$

$\leftarrow m_i$

$\xrightarrow{C_i}$

$\mathcal{A}$

Π

Case F_K

$\leftarrow m_i$

$\xrightarrow{r_i} F_K(r_i) \oplus m_i$

$\leftarrow (m_0^*, m_1^*)$

$\xrightarrow{C_i^* = F_K(r_i^*) \oplus m_i^*}$

$\leftarrow \hat{b}$

Case $\mathbb{F}$

$\leftarrow m_i$

$\xrightarrow{(r_i, m_i \oplus y_i)}$

$\leftarrow (m_i^*, y_i^*)$

$\leftarrow \hat{b}$

This is the
O/p
(not bit guessing)

$\leftarrow r^*$

$r^* \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$

$\xrightarrow{y^*}$

$C^* = (r^*, m_0^* \oplus y^*)$

$\leftarrow 1, \text{ if } \hat{b} = b$

$\xrightarrow{\hat{b}}$

(m_0^*, m_1^*)

Π

$$\frac{F \rightarrow \text{PRF}}{}$$

$$\left| \Pr[\mathcal{D}^{\bar{F}_k} = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}^f = 1] \right| \leq \text{negl}(n)$$

$$\left| \Pr[\text{PrivK}_{\pi, A}^{\text{CPA}} = 1] - \Pr[\text{PrivK}_{\tilde{\pi}, A}^{\text{CPA}} = 1] \right| \leq \text{negl}(n)$$



BAD occurs if $r^* \in \{r_1, \dots, r_q\}$

$\Rightarrow$ if BAD occurs then A can trivially distinguish

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[\text{PrivK}_{\tilde{\pi}, A}^{\text{CPA}} = 1] \\ & \leq \Pr[\text{BAD}] + \Pr[\text{PrivK}_{\tilde{\pi}, A}^{\text{CPA}} = 1 \wedge \overline{\text{BAD}}] \\ & \leq \left(\frac{q}{2^n} + \frac{1}{2} \right) \end{aligned}$$

$$\Pr[\text{PrivK}_{A,\Pi}^{\text{cpa}} = 1] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{q}{2^n} + \text{negl}(n)$$