Consensus and Blockchain Foundation of Cryptocurrency

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Inventing Harmonious Future

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# Distributed Systems



# Distributed Systems

A collection of independent computers that appears to its users as a single coherent system.

Key Features:

- Scalability Grow beyond one machine
- Fault Tolerance Survive server failures
- Geographic Reach Fast access worldwide
- Cost Efficiency Use cheaper hardware
- **Resource Sharing** Share devices and data like printers



# History of Distributed Systems

- 1960s Time-Sharing Systems: Early form of resource sharing, enabling multiple users to interact with a single mainframe.
- 1970s Networking and RPC: Development of ARPANET and early protocols. Concept of Remote Procedure Call (RPC) introduced.
- 1980s Workstations and LANs: Emergence of Local Area Networks (LANs); client-server models gain popularity.
- 1990s Internet and Web: Rise of the World Wide Web;
- 2000s Clusters and Grids: High-performance computing with commodity hardware; birth of grid computing and early cloud computing.
- 2010s Cloud and Big Data: Rapid growth of cloud platforms (AWS, Azure); distributed storage (HDFS), computing frameworks (MapReduce).
- 2020s Blockchain, and AI: blockchain-based systems, and AI-driven distributed frameworks.

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# Problem in Distributed Systems

- Distributed systems consist of **multiple independent nodes**.
- Failures, network delays, or malicious behavior can lead to: Conflicting data, Inconsistent system state, System-wide failure

**Challenge:** How do we maintain consistency across autonomous, potentially faulty nodes?

**Answer:** Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT): handling arbitrary faults

 $\Rightarrow$  These concepts laid the foundation for solving agreement in unreliable environments.



Distributed Systems Faulty Node



# The Byzantine Generals Problem (BGP)

- Lamport, Shostak, Pease [1978]
  - Multiple generals (nodes) of Byzantine army surround a strong city (network)
  - They must all agree to attack or retreat partial agreement leads to defeat.
  - Some generals may be traitors (Byzantine faults) who send conflicting or false messages.
  - The challenge: how can loyal generals reach agreement despite these malicious actors?

#### GOAL - Achieve consensus:

- All loyal generals agree on the same decision.
- If the commanding general is loyal, then all loyal generals will obey the commanding general's order.
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6 / 40

# **BGP** Outcomes



(betrayed) (betrayed)

(betraved)

# Attack or Not? Battle of Plassey (Palasi)

Generals of Siraj-ud-Daulah, Nawab of Bengal Generals in the Battle:

- Mir Jafar Commander-in-Chief
- Rai Durlabh Senior General
- Yar Lutuf Khan General
- Omiruddin Khan Artillery Commander (loyal but overwhelmed)
- Mohan Lal Loyal Officer and personal supporter of Siraj

British India company – Achieved Consensus? Army of Nawab– Achieved Consensus?





# Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT)

Definition:

- A system is considered **Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT)** if it can resist the challenges described by the Byzantine Generals Problem.
- A Byzantine fault refers to a failure mode where components either fail silently or behave arbitrarily/maliciously making consensus extremely difficult.

#### Why It's Challenging:

- This is considered the most difficult form of fault tolerance.
- There are no constraints on how a faulty or malicious node might behave it could lie, send inconsistent messages, or collude.

#### Example:

Consensus becomes significantly easier if nodes are either always truthful or always faulty in predictable ways

BFT assumes no such behavior model.

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# Byzantine Broadcast Protocol

■ Byzantine Broadcast is a fundamental problem in distributed systems where a designated sender (the leader) wants to send a value b ∈ {0,1} to all other nodes, and all honest (non-faulty) nodes must agree on the same value, even if some nodes are malicious (Byzantine faults). The protocol must satisfy:

#### **Protocol Requirements:**

- **Validity** If the sender is honest, all honest nodes agree on the sender's value.
- Consistency All honest nodes agree on the same value, regardless of sender behavior.
- Termination All honest nodes eventually decide on a value.

Corrupt nodes do not follow the protocol, form a coalition, hence can be treated as a single entity.

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# Naive Majority Voting Protocol





Sender sends to everyone

Everyone sends to everyother

Outputs the majority votes



# Naive Majority Voting Protocol





Sender sends to everyone

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Is it a Byzantine Broadcast protocol? No



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# Inconsistency Under a Single Corrupt Sender







# Inconsistency Under a Single Corrupt Sender







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## Reason and Fix





A gets b' from B, A gets b from A

A gets directly b and via b' X can deny that it sent different Solution: Digital Signature

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151

# **Digital Signatures Scheme**



# **Guarantees**:

• Authenticity: Confirms that the message was created by the claimed sender.

• Integrity: Ensures the message has not been altered since it was signed.

• Non-repudiation: Prevents the sender from denying that they signed the message.



# Fix



Every received signed message is re-signed and forward





# Does it solve?



If a node receives m with r valid sign from distinct nodes, and has not forwarded it before:

- It appends its own signature.
- It forwards the message (now with r + 1 signatures) to all nodes.

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# The Dolev-Strong Protocol: Assumptions and Model

Model:

- Synchronous Network with Authenticated Messages
- Tolerates up to f Byzantine nodes among n total nodes

Assumptions:

- Synchronous network: messages are delivered in known bounded time.
- Digital signatures: each node can sign messages, and signatures cannot be forged.
- Protocol runs for f + 1 rounds.

Properties Ensured:

- Validity: If the sender is honest, all honest nodes deliver *m*.
- Consistency: All honest nodes deliver the same value.
- **Termination:** All honest nodes eventually make a decision.

# The Dolev-Strong Protocol: Steps

#### Round 0: Sender Broadcasts

• The designated sender signs message *m* and sends it to all nodes.

#### Rounds 1 to f: Propagation

- For each round r = 1 to f:
  - If a node receives a message *m* with *r* valid signatures from distinct nodes, and has not forwarded it before:
    - It appends its own signature.
    - It forwards the message (now with r + 1 signatures) to all nodes.

#### Round f + 1: Final Decision

- Each node checks if it received message m with f + 1 distinct valid signatures.
- If yes, output *m*; otherwise, output a default value (e.g.,  $\perp$  or null).

Does it work? How? Why f + 1 rounds?

# Reality

In practical

- **1** Digital Signature is costly
- 2 It needs Public key infrastructure for keys

# Can we achieve Byzantine Broadcast without digital signatures and without a PKI?

# Yes! But has restrictions

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# Restrictions

Established:

1 If  $f \ge \frac{n}{3}$ , BB is **impossible** 2 If  $f < \frac{n}{3}$ , BB is possible

Intuition:

In the absence of cryptographic tools or trusted setup:

- Byzantine nodes can behave arbitrarily sending different messages to different nodes, impersonating others, and splitting the view of the network.
- When  $f \ge \frac{n}{3}$ , there may not be enough honest nodes to reach agreement or detect inconsistencies introduced by faulty behavior.
- No deterministic protocol can guarantee agreement without some mechanism to authenticate or verify the origin of messages.

# Byzantine Broadcast without Digital Signatures





# Byzantine Broadcast without Digital Signatures



Sender sends to everyone



22 / 40

# Byzantine Broadcast without Digital Signatures



-- Change the Sender -- Sender sends to everyone



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# BB without DS

- Challenge: What should be the value of k?
- Selection Strategy: How are the next senders selected?
- Randomized Selection:
  - A hash function  $H(i) \rightarrow \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  is used.
  - *H* ensures that senders or leaders are selected uniformly at random.



# The Protocol

- Initially:
  - The designated sender's sticky bit is its input bit.
  - All other nodes initialize their sticky bit to  $\perp$ .
- For each iteration  $r = 1, 2, \ldots, k$ :
  - **Round 0:** Leader  $L_r$  sends a proposed bit b to all nodes.
    - If  $L_r$ 's sticky bit  $\neq \perp$ , choose *b* as its sticky bit.
    - Else, choose  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  uniformly at random.
  - Round 1: Each node votes on a bit and sends it to all others.
    - If the node has a non- $\perp$  sticky bit, it votes using that.
    - Else, it votes using  $L_r$ 's proposed bit.
    - If  $L_r$  proposed both bits or none, pick a bit arbitrarily.
  - **Round 2:** Nodes tally received votes.
    - If at least 2n/3 votes are for the same bit  $b_0$ , update sticky bit to  $b_0$ .
    - Otherwise, set sticky bit to  $\perp$ .
- Output: Each node outputs its current sticky bit.

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# Byzantine Broadcast Without Digital Signatures

In this setting, we assume:

- No Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI)
- No digital signatures or cryptographic setup
- Synchronous communication model

#### **Upper Bound Result:**

When  $f \ge n/3$ , no protocol can guarantee the correctness properties of BB in the absence of signatures. This makes the bound of n > 3f both necessary and tight.

# Blockchain and State Machine Replication



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27 / 40

## Single-shot vs Repeated Consensus

- So far, we have considered single-shot consensus.
- In practice, many systems require consensus to be reached repeatedly over time.
- **Example:** Cryptocurrency systems like Bitcoin and Ethereum.
  - Maintain an ever-growing public ledger.
  - Record a sequence of all transactions.

## Blockchain as Repeated Consensus

- We define a repeated consensus abstraction: the blockchain.
- Traditionally known as state machine replication.
- Deployed long before Bitcoin:
  - Used by companies like Google and Facebook.
- The term "blockchain" became popular with Bitcoin.

# Blockchain as Repeated Consensus

- Goal: Nodes agree on a linearly-ordered, ever-growing log of transactions.
- Agreement is not per transaction, but per **batch** of transactions.
- A **block** is a batch of transactions (with metadata) *txs*.
- A blockchain is a chain of such blocks.



- *h*\* -> hash of previous block
- txs -> set of transactions
- $h \rightarrow$  hash present block
- p -> puzzle solution

- *h*\* -> Already there
- *txs* -> collects from a pool of transactions.
- *h* −> computes
- p -> puzzle solution to compute

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# Cont.



- Who compute the puzzle?
- Everyone-> who compute first will be considered as leader.
- Leader is going to propose it block.
- Follow Byzantine broadcast protocol for agreement.
- What if two computes at same time?
- What if it is delayed?
- Longest chain will be considered.



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## Transaction





# Handling Double-Spending



Wait for a few blocks (6).

- If multiple transactions spend the same coin:
  - Application may accept only the **first** transaction in the log.
- For safety, merchants should:
  - Wait until tx\* appears in the finalized log.
  - Ensure **no prior transaction** in the log spends the same coin.

# Problems in Proof of Work (PoW)

Puzzle: compute nonce x such that  $H(header||x) < 10^{y}$ .

- High Energy Consumption: Miners perform costly computations (e.g., SHA-256) to find valid blocks.
- Centralization Risk: Mining power tends to concentrate in regions with cheap electricity or in large pools.
- Latency and Throughput Limits: Block times and propagation delays restrict scalability.
- **51%** Attacks: An attacker controlling majority hash power can censor or double-spend.
- Hardware Waste: ASICs are expensive and not reusable outside mining.

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# How Proof of Stake (PoS) Addresses PoW Issues

Consider some leader propose a block. How to decide who will propose.

- Bitcoin: PoW
- Ethereum 1.0 : PoW
- Ethereum 2.0 : PoS
- PoS: Probability of proposing block equivalent to how rich the node is.
  - Misbehavior leads to slashing of stake.
  - Cost of attack proportional to value at risk.



## How is it efficient

Leader selection

Deterministic though random-> eliminates hash computation

Committee

small size, Deterministic though random-> eliminates communication cost.



# How does it works



# Smart Contracts

Replace Transaction with a program (function) – Contract between parties

- Definition: Self-executing programs stored on the blockchain that run when predefined conditions are met.
- Trustless Execution:
  - No intermediaries needed.
  - Outcome is enforced by the code.
- **Deterministic:** Same inputs always produce the same outputs on every node.
- Immutable and Transparent: Code is visible and cannot be changed once deployed.
- Applications:
  - Decentralized Finance (DeFi)
  - Token issuance ( NFTs –: Non-Fungible Tokens )
  - Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) and governance



# Types of Leader Selection Mechanisms in Blockchain I

## Proof of Capacity (PoC):

- Use hard drive space as mining resource.
- Used by: Chia (XCH), Burstcoin (BURST).

## Proof of Authority (PoA):

- Pre-approved trusted validators.
- Used by: VeChain (VET), Ethereum Kovan/Testnets.

## Proof of Activity (PoA):

- Hybrid of PoW (block creation) and PoS (validation).
- Used by: Decred (DCR).

## Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET):

- Random wait time via trusted execution environments (TEE).
- Used by: Hyperledger Sawtooth.

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